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TOWARD A DEFENSE OF FAIR USE ENABLEMENT,
OR HOW U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW IS HURTING MY DAUGHTER
Essay
by JOSEPH P. LIU*
My interest in copyright law used to be almost entirely professional,
but a recent event made it far more personal than I would like.  This is the
story of how U.S. copyright law is hurting my nine-year-old daughter.
I.
A.
Several months ago, my daughter Cate’s after-school program ran a
fund-raiser.  The kids in the program were given a piece of paper and
asked to draw something on it.  Whatever they drew was to be sent to a
company, which would then put the drawing on all manner of things — t-
shirts, pot-holders, key chains, coffee mugs, you name it.  These items
would then be offered for sale to proud and eager parents, grandparents,
and relatives.  The after-school program and the company would split the
profits.  The children would proudly see their artwork valued and inciden-
tally absorb an important lesson in merchandising.  Everyone wins.
So my daughter dutifully produced the following picture of three cats
(large, medium, and small), which generated brisk sales among the target
market, and which I proudly reproduce here:
*Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  2010 by Joseph P. Liu. Thanks
to Julie Cohen, Stacey Dogan, David Olson and Alfred Yen for helpful comments
and suggestions.
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When I first saw the drawing, I complimented my daughter and asked
her how she had decided to draw the three cats in the picture.  The choice
seemed a bit peculiar to me, since my daughter is deathly allergic to cats
and, as a result, views them with a mixture of fascination and fear, like
cuddly poisonous snakes.  She told me that she had originally started to
draw, not three cats, but three Totoros.  However, she changed her draw-
ing in mid-stream, adapting her drawing to the new subject matter.
For those not familiar with Totoro, he (or it) is a character from an
animated film, My Neighbor Totoro,1 by the famous Japanese animator
Hayao Miyazake. Totoros can come in various sizes: large, medium, and
small.  They look something like this:
1 TONARI NO TOTORO (Tokuma Japan Communications Co., Ltd. 1988).
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Having seen the movie many times, my daughter was a huge fan.  So,
quite naturally, she started drawing three Totoros on her piece of paper.
Soon after she started, however, she was gently told by one of her
after-school teachers that she could not, in fact, draw the Totoros as she
had wished.  According to the teacher, the rule was that the children could
not draw any characters that were “famous.”  So, having begun to outline
her Totoros on her piece of paper, she quickly adapted her drawing and
turned it instead into the drawing of the three Totoro-shaped cats.  My
daughter accepted the change without much fuss.
The same could not be said of me. As a copyright scholar, I immedi-
ately understood the reason for the rule: copyright law.  At the time, I
guessed (correctly, it turned out) that the rule had probably been handed
down, not by the after-school teachers, but by the company that would
produce the purchased items.  The company implemented the rule, not
because they hated children, but because they were concerned about po-
tential copyright liability.  They were worried that they could be sued by
the owners of “famous” characters like Totoro, Batman, Barbie, and the
like.
Although I recognized the reason for the rule, I was nevertheless up-
set, though I tried (unsuccessfully) to hide this from my daughter.  My
daughter loves to draw.  Like many children, she expresses herself through
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her drawings.  And like many children (and adults, for that matter), she
often copies what she sees around her.  Until recently, she had made little
distinction between drawing things she saw in the physical world and
things she saw on screen or in print.  It troubled me greatly to hear that
she had been told, in effect, not to express herself creatively in the way she
wished, that certain images were off-limits.  Not because they were inap-
propriate in any way for a child, but because they violated U.S. copyright
law.
After she told me this story over dinner, I told her that I thought she
probably could have gone ahead and drawn the Totoros and that nothing
bad would have happened.  My daughter knows that I am a law professor,
and she knows that I specialize in something called “copyright law,”
though the outlines of the area are rather hazy to her.  She is a very rule-
oriented girl and once asked if I could come to her class and “explain the
law” to the unruly boys in her class.  Yet none of my credentials could
shake her firm belief that it was improper for her to draw anything “fa-
mous” on that piece of paper.  Because, as everyone knows, dads don’t
really know anything about what goes on in school.
B.
As it turns out, my daughter may well have been right.  After my
initial bout of fatherly outrage, I stepped back, put on my professional hat
and asked myself: if I were the lawyer for the company that made these
items, would I have instituted a similar rule?  And the answer is a defini-
tive yes.  In fact, it’s not even close.  Without such a rule, the company
could potentially be exposed to massive copyright liability.
Here’s why.  Copyright law gives the copyright owner the exclusive
right to reproduce the work and to create derivative works based on the
original work.2  So the owner of the copyright in depictions of Totoro or
Batman or Barbie has the right to prevent others from reproducing those
works.  This would, in theory, extend to someone’s drawing of those copy-
righted characters.  Even a drawing of Batman by a nine-year-old in
school could, strictly speaking, be a violation of the reproduction or deriv-
ative work right.
Now of course, such a drawing by a nine-year-old would almost cer-
tainly be fair use.3  Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement, and in
assessing whether a use is fair, courts look to various factors, including: (1)
the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the work copied;
(3) the amount used; and (4) the impact on the market for the work.  The
use by the nine-year-old is a non-commercial use, done in an educational
2 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
3 Id. § 107.
\\server05\productn\C\CPY\57-3\CPY301.txt unknown Seq: 5 27-JUL-10 11:08
Toward a Defense of Fair Use Enablement 105
setting.  The use is creative and transformative.  Moreover, there is no
conceivable harm to the market. Batman is safe from the economic threat
posed by grade-schoolers across the country.  So there would likely be no
liability here, just as my daughter would not have been liable for her draw-
ing of the Totoros on her piece of paper.
Yet the same could not be said of the company that produced the key
chains, coffee mugs, and t-shirts.  The company, in putting a child’s draw-
ing of Batman on a poster or coffee mug or key chain, would also be mak-
ing a reproduction of, or derivative work based upon, the copyrighted
work.  There would be a clear, prima facie case of infringement. The
Copyright Act provides for statutory damages of between $750 and
$30,000 for each work infringed.4  Multiply that by thousands of drawings
of thousands of different copyrighted works by thousands of children
around the country, and you have the potential for massive copyright
liability.
Would the company, like the children, be able to take advantage of a
fair use defense?  Here, the answer is probably no. Applying the four fair
use factors to the company leads to a very different conclusion.  The big-
gest problem is that, unlike the children’s use, the company’s use is clearly
commercial. The company is profiting from the infringing activity.  It is not
engaging in a use for educational purposes.  Furthermore, the company, as
a large-scale commercial entity, could have secured licenses from the own-
ers of the various copyrights.  In failing to do so, the company is depriving
the copyright owners of valuable licensing revenue in the market for, say,
Batman-themed posters, key-chains, and coffee mugs.  Thus, a court could
quite easily conclude that the company’s actions are not fair use.
C.
At one level, it makes sense to treat the company and the children
differently.  The children present no risk to the economic interests of the
copyright owners.  Their use is creative and transformative — exactly the
kind of use copyright privileges.  Copyright would be intolerable if its ef-
fect was to prevent children from exercising their imaginations.  By con-
trast, the company is not engaging in much of a transformative use itself.
It is a commercial entity, profiting from the infringing activity.  It has the
means to secure a license from the copyright owners.  Thus, in one sense,
the company should quite properly be treated differently.
However, as the example of my daughter highlights, the interests of
the children and the interests of the company are not so neatly separated.
This is because imposing liability on the company affects the creative op-
tions available to the children.  Imposing liability on the company leads to
4 Id. § 504(c)(1).
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a rule that the children cannot draw what they like.  It narrows the realm
within which they can be freely expressive, the realm within which they
can copy as much as they want.  The children are told, quite expressly, that
there are limits to their creativity.
Now, one could certainly argue that this is something we should not
be terribly concerned about.  The children remain free to exercise their
own fair use privileges.  They can copy as much as they want in their class-
rooms.  Nothing is preventing them from engaging in all sorts of non-com-
mercial uses of copyrighted works.  The inability to then have their work
pasted on t-shirts and coffee mugs is not a huge tragedy.  They should not
have any right to see their work on these kinds of items.
Yet this perspective is, I think, unduly narrow.  Start with the proposi-
tion that we want to encourage children to exercise their imaginations.
We want them to freely copy and transform what they see, regardless of
whether it is copyrighted or not.  When they make their own drawings of
Batman or Barbie, this is something we celebrate and praise, not some-
thing we grudgingly permit.  If what the children do is an affirmative good,
we should be attentive, not only to their formal legal rights, but to the
conditions surrounding the exercise of these rights.  We should care just as
much about the environment within which they exercise their creativity.
We should make sure that the conditions encourage creativity and allow
children to exercise their imaginations as fully as possible.
This attention to the conditions that enable creativity and fair use has,
I believe, been largely missing from copyright law.  Copyright law has his-
torically given private individuals reasonably broad fair use privileges.  It
has been less sympathetic, however, to intermediaries that facilitate the
ability of individuals to exercise these privileges.  In fact, it has largely
viewed intermediaries, not as facilitators of fair use, but as facilitators of
infringement.5
In the rest of this Essay, I will explore the doctrinal and theoretical
foundations for this view, and I will suggest that it misses something im-
portant.  A better approach would look more broadly not only at the theo-
retical availability of a fair use defense, but at the practical ability of
individuals to fully exercise their fair use rights and privileges.6  Specifi-
5 See infra Part II.A.
6 Note that I will use the terms “right” and “privilege” interchangeably in this
Essay when referring to the fair use interests of individuals. Contra WES-
LEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JU-
DICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1919). Commentators
sometimes disagree over whether fair use is properly viewed as a right, a
privilege, a defense, an immunity, or something else entirely.  This disagree-
ment is beyond the scope of this short Essay.  As will be clear infra, I do
believe that some individuals have affirmative fair use interests, which copy-
right law should recognize, regardless of what terminology we adopt.
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cally, such an approach would look carefully at how liability for in-
termediaries affects the fair use privileges of individuals. I will argue that
this interest should find doctrinal expression through a defense of fair use
enablement.7
Finally, I will suggest that this perspective has implications beyond the
narrow example of my daughter, mentioned above.  Copyright law draws
no distinction between creative children and creative adults.  We have, in
each of us, the potential to create, to build upon the works of others.  And
as others have noted, dramatic changes in digital technology have given us
far greater ability to exercise these creative impulses and to share the re-
sults with others.8  Today, individuals can manipulate and transform copy-
righted works with ever more sophistication and share the results easily
with a world-wide audience.  We need to be particularly careful to ensure
that the conditions that enable and encourage this kind of creative impulse
continue to exist.  A defense of fair use enablement would help create the
kind of breathing space that would allow this creative impulse to flourish.
II.
A.
As I have noted above, courts have generally not been very sympa-
thetic to attempts by companies to invoke the fair use claims of their cus-
tomers.9  Instead, courts have generally ignored these claims, choosing
instead to measure fair use from the perspective of the companies them-
selves.  Indeed, in some cases, neither the courts nor the parties appear to
recognize that the fair use claims of customers might even be relevant.
The most explicit rejection of this kind of argument can be found in a
series of cases from the 1990s involving photocopy shops.10  At issue in
7 I introduced a version of this argument in an earlier conference paper, Joseph
P. Liu, Enabling Copyright Consumers, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1099
(2007).  The goal of this Essay is to develop this idea in a more detailed
fashion. See also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Entrepreneurial Copyright Fair
Use: Let the Independent Contractor Stand in the Shoes of the User, 57 ARK.
L. REV. 539 (2004).
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND CULTURE THRIVE IN
A HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
9 I am focusing here on direct infringement cases.  This is not the case with re-
spect to indirect copyright infringement cases, where the fair use claims of
customers play an important role. See, e.g., Sony v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984).  I discuss the indirect infringement cases in more detail
in Part II.C infra, and explain why, doctrinally, these cases are treated dif-
ferently, even though there are good reasons to treat them similarly.
10 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp.
1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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these cases was whether photocopy shops like Kinko’s were liable for as-
sembling and copying packets of copyrighted readings, or “coursepacks,”
on behalf of college professors.  The professors selected articles and chap-
ters of books that they wanted to assign for a particular class.  They then
gave the articles and books to the photocopy shops, which would then
make photocopies of these selections, bind the copied materials, and sell
them to the students for a profit.  The students benefited from this prac-
tice, since they could get the readings without having to pay for all of the
books in which the excerpts appeared.  The owners of the copyrights in the
copied books and articles, however, were not so happy with this arrange-
ment, and they sued the copy shops for copyright infringement.
The copy shops raised a fair use defense.11  Specifically, they pointed
to the potential fair use arguments of the college and graduate students
who purchased the coursepacks.  If the students themselves had individu-
ally assembled and photocopied the coursepacks, they would have had a
colorable fair use argument, in light of the minimal amount of copying and
the educational purpose of the copying.  The copy shops argued that their
actions merely made this process more efficient and that they should be
entitled to the benefit of the students’ fair use arguments.  It would, they
argued, be anomalous to penalize them for simply facilitating what the
students themselves could do individually.
Indeed, a dissenting opinion in the one of these cases, Princeton Uni-
versity Press v. Michigan Document Services, largely accepted this view.
The dissent first noted that it believed the students would have had a suc-
cessful fair use defense if they had made the coursepacks themselves.  It
then went on:
Given the focus of the Copyright Act, the only practical difference be-
tween this case and that of a student making his or her own copies is that
commercial photocopying is faster and more cost-effective.  Censuring in-
cidental private sector profit reflects little of the essence of copyright
law.12
Under this view, the photocopy shops were merely helping the stu-
dents more efficiently exercise their fair use privileges.  Accordingly, the
photocopy shops should be entitled to raise the fair use arguments of their
customers.
The majority in that case, however, expressly rejected this argument,
refusing even to consider the potential fair use arguments of the students:
As to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or
professors to make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from
doubt. We need not decide this question, however, for the fact is that the
11 Princeton, 99 F.3d at 1385.
12 Id. at 1393 (Martin, C.J., dissenting).
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copying complained of here was performed on a profit-making basis by a
commercial enterprise.13
The majority thus refused to permit the copy shops to stand in the
shoes of the students and assert their fair use defense.  Instead, the court
applied the fair use factors from the perspective, not of the students, but of
the copy shops themselves.  In so doing, it found that the activities of the
copy shops were clearly commercial, not educational; that the copying was
non-transformative; and that the copy shops’ actions deprived the copy-
right owners of potential revenues, both in the form of lost sales of books
and articles, as well as lost potential licensing revenues.14
Note that under the majority’s analysis, the fair use arguments of the
students and professors were not just potentially weak, but irrelevant.  The
majority implied that it did not agree with the dissent’s conclusion that the
copying would have been fair use if done by the students.  More than that,
however, the majority indicated that this was entirely beside the point,
because even if the students had a valid fair use defense, it would have
made no difference.  That is, even if the copy shops were facilitating con-
cededly fair uses by the students, the copy shops would be liable.  They
would not be able to invoke the fair use rights of their customers.  Instead,
fair use had to be measured from the perspective of the copy shops alone.
This same issue arises in other copyright cases as well, although it has
not been expressly litigated nor even widely recognized. In the recent case
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings15 a cable television company, Cablevi-
sion, provided a service that allowed cable customers to record television
shows for later viewing, in much the same way a customer could record
shows using a digital video recorder (DVR) such as a TiVo.  The differ-
ence, however, was that instead of giving the viewer a DVR to operate in
his or her home, the cable company recorded the shows, at the viewer’s
behest, on a computer hard disk located at the cable company’s facilities.
The viewer could then, through controlling his or her cable box, order the
show to be transmitted from the cable company’s hard disk to the cus-
tomer’s television on demand.
A number of movie studios sued Cablevision for direct infringement
of their copyrighted shows.  The studios argued that the cable company
violated their copyrights by making unauthorized copies of their copy-
righted shows on Cablevision’s hard disks and then later performing them
for the viewer.
Although it chose not to, Cablevision could have made the same argu-
ment raised in the copy shop cases.  Viewers of broadcast television have a
13 Id. at 1389 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1386.
14 Id. at 1389.
15 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
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well-established fair use privilege to record television broadcasts for later
personal viewing — so-called “time shifting.”16  Cablevision’s service ar-
guably did no more than enhance a viewer’s ability to exercise this privi-
lege, making it easier and more efficient.  Thus, Cablevision’s actions
facilitated the fair use privileges of its customers.  If the customers have a
clear fair use right to time-shift the shows, it is hard to see why Cablevision
should be liable for facilitating this and making this more efficient.  In-
deed, imposing liability on Cablevision would have the perverse effect of
requiring it to intentionally adopt a less efficient technology in order to
avoid liability, for example by distributing DVRs individually to each of
their customers.
For various procedural reasons, Cablevision never made this argu-
ment before the court.  Had it done so, however, chances are it would
have been rejected for the same reasons articulated in the copy shop cases
above.  Moreover, once analyzed from the perspective of Cablevision
rather than its customers, the fair use defense looks far weaker.  Cablevi-
sion is a for-profit company engaging in a commercial and nontransforma-
tive use, it is copying the entire copyrighted work, the work is creative, and
Cablevision could certainly negotiate with the copyright owners to obtain
a license for this kind of use (just as it negotiates for rights to make works
available through its on-demand service).  Thus, if a court refused to con-
sider the fair use arguments of the customers, there is a good chance that
Cablevision would be held liable.  This is so even though the customers
have a very strong fair use argument.
This dynamic also appears, though it has generally not been recog-
nized, in the controversy over companies that edit movie DVDs on behalf
of customers.  A number of years ago, a company called Clean Flicks pro-
vided a service whereby customers could send it movie DVDs that they
had purchased and ask Clean Flicks to edit out portions of the movie that
were deemed objectionable (i.e., by editing out or blurring scenes contain-
ing nudity, violence, or adult language).  Clean Flicks made a copy of the
movie, edited that copy in accordance with the customer’s wishes, and
then returned both the original and the edited copy to the customer.17  In
so doing, Clean Flicks served a market for edited versions of popular
movies.
The movie industry sued Clean Flicks for copyright infringement and
won.18  In finding Clean Flicks liable, the court rejected a fair use defense.
16 See Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
17 In practice, Clean Flicks retained already-edited versions of the movies and
sent copies out to customers who provided them with the corresponding
movie DVDs.
18 Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo.
2006).
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Just as in the copy shop cases, the court analyzed the fair use defense from
the perspective of Clean Flicks and found that the use was commercial and
only minimally transformative, that Clean Flicks copied the entire work,
that the work was creative, and that the use harmed the market for edited
versions of the original movies.
Left unaddressed, as in the previous cases, was the potential customer
interest.  Had individual purchasers of the DVDs made their own edits to
their DVDs for their own viewing purposes, this type of activity would
likely have been fair use, as the editing would have been non-commercial
and personal, and would not likely have affected the market for the work.
At the very least, there would have been a decent fair use argument.
Clean Flicks could have made the argument that it was merely facilitating
the fair use privileges of its customers.
Indeed, the facilitation argument in this case may be even stronger
than in the other cases mentioned above.  This is because, unlike the cases
above, technology makes it difficult if not impossible for consumers to ex-
ercise their fair use privileges on their own.  Movies on DVDs are pro-
tected by an encryption algorithm, which prevents individuals from easily
copying or manipulating the copyrighted movie.19  Most consumers lack
the expertise to defeat the encryption.  Thus, to the extent DVD owners
wanted to exercise their fair use privileges with respect to the copyrighted
movies, they had to rely upon companies like Clean Flicks.  Not only was
Clean Flicks helpful for engaging in fair use, in this case it was essential.
This argument, however, was never addressed by the court in the
Clean Flicks case.  The consumer interest in getting access to edited ver-
sions of the DVDs was addressed only in passing and quickly rejected by
the court, without much discussion.20
The cases above all share a common dynamic.  In each case, a com-
pany makes a copy of, or a derivative work based upon, a pre-existing
copyrighted work and sells the resulting product to a consumer.  In each
case, if the consumer had engaged in the copying, the consumer would
have had a colorable fair use argument.  In each case, the company is facil-
itating the fair use of the consumer, making the fair use more efficient or
19 Decryption technologies are not widely available to the public as a result of
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). 17
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2006).  The DMCA is discussed in more detail in-
fra, Part III.B.
20 See also Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 582 (6th
Cir. 2007), which involved a copyright claim against a company that made
karaoke versions of copyrighted songs without authorization.  The defen-
dant argued that it was facilitating the privileged actions of the users of its
karaoke songs.  The court rejected this argument, citing Princeton for the
proposition that “the end-user’s utilization of the product is largely
irrelevant.”
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simply possible.  And common to all of these cases is a failure to consider,
or outright rejection of, the fair use claims of the company’s customers.
Instead, courts, to the extent they address this issue at all, focus exclusively
on the companies themselves and the extent to which they were contribut-
ing to, and profiting from, the unauthorized copying of copyrighted
works.21  Missing is any consideration of the impact on the ability of the
consumers to practically take advantage of their fair use privileges.
B.
The refusal, in these cases, to consider the fair use interests of a com-
pany’s customers reflects a particular understanding of copyright law and
fair use, one that views fair use as primarily a response to market failure.22
Under this very influential view, certain small-scale uses of copyrighted
works should be fair because the cost of licensing the use outweighs the
value of that use to the potential user.  Take, for example, the case of a
student who wants to photocopy a journal article she finds in a library.  To
negotiate a license, she would have to find the copyright owner, contact
the owner, negotiate a the terms of the license, have it drafted, and pay a
royalty.  Even if both parties would agree to such a license, the cost of
doing all of this would greatly exceed the value of the use itself.  Transac-
tions costs prevent the market from achieving the efficient result.
Under a market-failure rationale, fair use should transfer the entitle-
ment in such circumstances to the student in order to achieve the efficient
result.  The role of fair us is to mimic what the market would achieve in
the absence of transactions costs.  This view of fair use as a response to
market failure provides a powerful explanation for why certain small-scale
acts of copying are considered fair use.
Under this view, the copy shop cases make sense.  The only reason
the students have a right to make photocopies is because the transactions
costs of licensing the use are too great.  However, once the copy shop steps
in as an intermediary, the transactions costs are greatly lowered.23  The
21 There are cases in addition to the ones above, which exhibit this dynamic. See,
e.g., UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
discussed in Liu, supra note 7. See also Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F.
Supp. 1186, 1194-95 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1490
(11th Cir. 1984) (refusing to let operator of a TV news clipping service to
stand in the shoes of its customers for fair use purposes).
22 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982) (articulating the basic framework, though advancing a far more ex-
pansive and nuanced notion of market failure).
23 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract
in the Newtonian World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
115 (1997).
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copy shop can license the right to make copies from the copyright owners
far more efficiently.  Indeed, in the copy shop cases, the publishing compa-
nies pointed out that copy shops other than the defendant had in fact suc-
cessfully obtained licenses for their coursepacks.24 Thus, under these
circumstances, the market does not fail, and there is no need to find the
use fair.  Under these circumstances, it makes sense to ignore the potential
fair use defenses of the students and focus on the actions of the copy shop.
However, this understanding of fair use as market failure is not the
only one.  Another understanding of fair use, one that pre-dates the mar-
ket failure rationale, views fair use as affirmatively encouraging certain
types of uses that are socially beneficial.  Fair use is not solely a response
to market failure, but also an important affirmative privilege.  Under this
view, uses that are related to comment, criticism, education, and news re-
porting have a privileged status in copyright.25  Imposing liability on these
kinds of uses would have the ultimate effect of hindering the kind of pro-
gress and dissemination of knowledge that copyright is meant to
encourage.26
Moreover, under this view, these uses should be privileged whether or
not the user could in theory efficiently seek a license from the copyright
owner.  That is, these uses are not justified based on market failure, but on
the intrinsic value of these uses.  Take, for example, a book reviewer’s
ability to quote from the book in his review.  Even if the publishing com-
panies offered a low-cost “book reviewer quotation license,” this type of
use would be fair, because under this view, fair use is not just limited to
cases of market failure.  Instead, fair use affirmatively creates space for
uses that we want to encourage.
Viewed from this perspective, it is not at all clear why the courts
should disregard the fair use rights of the customers when deciding the
liability of the companies that facilitate such uses.  Under this view, the
fair uses are privileged uses, which the copyright act affirmatively values.
The companies, under this view, are merely facilitating the fair use privi-
leges of the customers. They are enabling customers to exercise their fair
use privileges in a far more effective and efficient manner.  Under this
24 See Princeton, 99 F.3d at 1387 (noting that other copy shops obtained licenses
from the copyright owners); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60
F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir.1994).
25 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[F]or purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. . . ..”); see, e.g., Lydia Pallas
Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
26 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story,
J.).
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affirmative view of fair use, it is not at all clear why all of the benefits of
this increased efficiency should belong entirely to the copyright owners.
In fact, there are good reasons to believe just the opposite.  Return to
the example of the children’s drawings from the beginning of this Essay.
The drawings made by these children are fair uses, not because it would be
too costly for the schools to get licenses from the copyright owners, but
because there is an affirmative value in encouraging the education and
personal creativity of small children.  These uses are not grudging excep-
tions to expansive copyright liability, but instead precisely the kinds of
uses that are to be most celebrated.  These are not uses that we simply
tolerate, but uses that we want to encourage.
If this is the case, then the actions of the company look quite differ-
ent.  The company is not making money off of the copyrighted works of
the copyright owners.  (Indeed, it is hard to believe that the value of the
company’s products to the parents is materially affected by the inclusion
or exclusion of copyrighted subject matter by the children.)  Rather, it is
making it possible for the children to exercise their creative impulses more
fully.  The company is enabling and facilitating the fair use privileges of
the children.  And although the company is turning a profit, the profit is
merely the reward it properly receives for facilitating these fair uses and
enabling the creativity of the children.  It is precisely the kind of reward
that the market gives companies for making certain socially-desirable ac-
tivities more efficient.
Which of these competing perspectives to adopt depends on the na-
ture of the underlying fair use.  I am certainly not saying that in every case,
the intermediary company should be entitled to proceed without liability.
If, for example, the company encouraged children not to draw their own
pictures but to clip out and send in photos of clearly copyrighted works,
this would look quite different.  And it is quite possible that the copy shop
cases were correctly decided, insofar as the fair use arguments of the stu-
dents and professors were not entirely clear cut and implicated a particular
market for educational materials.  Accordingly, a fair use claim by the
users should not always be dispositive.
I am saying, however, that the fair use interests of the users should be
relevant, and that current law, in categorically ignoring those interests,
misses an important part of the picture.  Current law draws little distinc-
tion between the company that puts the drawings of grade schoolers on t-
shirts and mugs, and the company that makes pirated versions of licensed
t-shirts and mugs.  Current law fails to consider the impact of copyright
liability on the fair use privileges of individuals.  Rather than refusing to
consider the fair use interests of the customers and treating such interests
as a residual interest to be eliminated by more efficient markets, courts
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should instead analyze those interests expressly and consider how they are
affected by the imposition of copyright liability on the companies.
More broadly, the approach currently taken by the courts reflects a
particularly cramped understanding of copyright and fair use, one that
views this issue primarily from the perspective of the copyright owners.
While this view is very important, it is just as important that we keep in
mind the perspective of potential fair users and, crucially, not just their
theoretical privilege to engage in fair use, but the broader context and
environment within which they exercise that privilege.
C.
Before discussing how copyright law can take customer fair use inter-
ests into account in these cases, I want to spend a bit of time discussing
one area where copyright already considers these interests extensively.  By
focusing on an area where customer fair use interests are already consid-
ered, I hope to show how anomalous it is that they are not considered in
the cases above.  Indeed, the proposal in this Essay would make considera-
tion of customer fair use interests more consistent.
Customer fair use interests play an important role in the area of third-
party or indirect copyright liability.  Under some circumstances, copyright
law extends liability beyond the direct infringer to those who knowingly
facilitate infringement.  For example, one who sells a commercial DVD-
copying machine to a person who is clearly going to use it to make unau-
thorized DVDs would be liable for copyright infringement, even though
the seller of the machine is not making or selling the copies himself or
herself.
In sharp contrast to the direct liability cases mentioned above, courts
in these indirect liability cases spend extensive time and effort analyzing
the fair use claims of the customers.  Take, for example, Lewis Galoob
Toys v. Nintendo of America.27  In that case, Nintendo made and sold a
video game console that accepted cartridges containing video games.  The
defendant, Galoob, made a device called the Game Genie, which consum-
ers could interpose between the game cartridge and the video game con-
sole.  The Game Genie permitted end-users to alter the game play of
certain Nintendo games, by for example increasing the number of lives or
speeding up the game play.
Nintendo sued Galoob for copyright infringement, arguing that the
altered games produced by use of the Game Genie were unauthorized de-
rivative works based on the original copyrighted video games.  Although
these altered games were, strictly speaking, created by the Game Genie
customers, Nintendo argued that Galoob should be held liable for contrib-
27 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
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uting to the infringing activity.  Galoob defended by arguing that the cus-
tomers who used the Game Genie were engaging in fair use, since they
were engaging in a private, non-commercial use that had no impact on the
market for video games.  Nintendo responded by arguing that fair use
should be measured, not from the perspective of the customers, but from
the perspective of Galoob.  And since Galoob’s use was commercial and
not private, Galoob should not be entitled to a fair use defense.
Galoob thus presented a question similar to that raised in the cases in
the previous section: to what extent should a court consider the fair use
claims of a company’s customers?  Unlike the courts in the direct infringe-
ment cases, however, the court in Galoob expressly chose to analyze fair
use from the perspective of the end-user and expressly rejected the argu-
ment that it should analyze fair use from the perspective of Galoob.  Hav-
ing made this decision, the court went on to conclude that the end-user’s
use of the Game Genie constituted fair use, and therefore Galoob could
not be liable for contributory liability.
Another example of judicial solicitude toward customer fair use
claims can be found in Sony v. Universal City Studios.28  The case involved
a contributory liability claim brought by movie studios against Sony, the
manufacturer of the VCR.  The movie studios claimed that Sony custom-
ers were committing copyright infringement by using Sony’s VCRs to
make unauthorized copies of copyrighted television broadcasts, and that
Sony should be contributorily liable for knowingly facilitating this infring-
ing activity.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sony placed great weight on the fair
use claims of Sony’s customers.  The court held that some customers used
the VCR to record broadcast television shows for later viewing, and that
this “time shifting” was fair use, since it was private, non-commercial, and
had no impact on the market for the television shows.  The court then held
that, because the VCR was capable of substantial non-infringing uses by
Sony customers, Sony could not be held liable for contributory infringe-
ment.  Again, unlike the direct infringement cases discussed in the previ-
ous section, the Sony opinion analyzed fair use from the perspective of
Sony’s customers.
What explains the different attitude toward the fair use claims of cus-
tomers in these cases?  The answer is relatively straightforward and lies in
the doctrinal basis for indirect liability.  For there to be indirect liability,
there must first be direct liability.  If the end-users are engaging in fair use,
there is no direct liability and therefore no secondary liability.  Thus, there
is a doctrinal hook for consideration of customer fair use arguments.  In
the direct liability cases, by contrast, there is no similar doctrinal hook,
28 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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since the company itself is engaging in the copying.  The company’s liabil-
ity does not depend on the customer’s liability.  Courts have thus generally
ignored the customer’s fair use arguments and focused exclusively on the
fair use arguments of the company itself.
Although there may be a good doctrinal reason for completely ignor-
ing customer fair use arguments in the direct liability cases, there is, as I
have argued above, no good policy reason for doing so.  In the indirect
liability cases, the courts are acutely aware of the potential impact that
imposing copyright liability on the companies may have on the companies’
customers.  This concern animates the decisions in Sony, Galoob, and
many other indirect liability cases.  Thus, for example, whether to impose
liability on Sony is heavily affected by the potential impact on Sony’s cus-
tomers and their ability to engage in fair uses.
Many of these exact same concerns exist in the corresponding direct
liability cases. Companies like the t-shirt and mug company, the copy
shops, and the DVD-editing companies all provide services that facilitate
the fair use privileges of their customers.  Imposing liability on these enti-
ties may have a significant impact on the practical ability of these individu-
als to exercise their fair use privileges.  This concern need not be
dispositive of the issue of liability, but it should at least enter into a court’s
calculations.  The basic point is that this same policy concern appears in
both the direct and indirect liability cases.
Indeed, highlighting the problematic nature of this differential treat-
ment, it is not always completely clear whether a particular case is a direct
or indirect liability case.  In Cartoon Network, for example, the court spent
a good deal of time deciding who was the direct infringer: the cable com-
pany that set up the automated recording system or the consumer who
determined which television shows to copy?29  A case could be made for
either party.  Indeed, the district court initially held that the cable com-
pany was the direct infringer.30  On appeal, however, the court ultimately
concluded that the customer was responsible for making the copy.  Al-
though Cablevision set up the equipment that enabled the customer to
copy the television shows, the customer decided which shows to copy and
when to later view the shows.  Accordingly, the appellate court held that
Cablevision could not be held directly liable.31
29 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (ultimately concluding that the customers were
responsible for making the copies).
30 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d
607 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (Cablevision I).
31 Similarly, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D.Cal.1995), the court determined that, although Netcom’s servers were
making and distributing copies, it was doing so at the behest of end-users
who were uploading and downloading the copyrighted content.
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In theory, even though Cablevision was not directly liable, it could
still have been liable for contributory infringement for facilitating the
copying by the customers.  In fact, however, this claim was foreclosed be-
cause, during the negotiations leading up to the district court’s decision,
the plaintiffs agreed to waive their contributory infringement claim in ex-
change for Cablevision’s agreement not to raise a fair use defense.  How-
ever, if the movie studios had brought a contributory liability claim,
Cablevision would have been able to raise the fair use arguments of its
customers, just as Sony did.  Moreover, such a claim would have been rea-
sonably strong.
Note, however, that if the court had instead decided that Cablevision
was directly responsible for the copying, the treatment of the customers’
fair use claims would have been very different.  Under current doctrine,
any potential fair use arguments of Cablevision’s customers would have
been completely irrelevant.  The court would have measured fair use from
Cablevision’s perspective and completely ignored any fair use arguments
from the customers.  Yet the same policy considerations are present,
whether the basis for liability is direct or indirect.  In either situation, im-
posing liability on Cablevision would have a significant impact on the le-
gitimate fair use privileges of Cablevision’s customers.  It makes little
sense to find end user fair use rights completely dispositive in one context
and completely irrelevant in the other.
This is particularly true as technologies begin to further blur the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect liability. Cablevision is but an exam-
ple of a trend.  Increasingly, companies are not content to sell devices that
enable consumers to manipulate copyrighted materials.  Rather, compa-
nies seek to maintain a more interactive relationship with their customers,
providing services rather than just technologies.  As this trend intensifies,
we may well see an increasing dependence on the part of consumers on
the actions of these companies.  If so, then it becomes even more impor-
tant to consider how liability for these companies affects their customers.
In many ways, the extension of end-user fair use arguments to direct
liability cases is the mirror image of the extension of indirect copyright
liability based on end-user actions.  In the indirect liability cases, the com-
Both Cartoon Network and Netcom suggest that one way to preserve end-user
rights in such cases would be to hold that the end-user is actually responsi-
ble for the copying, and that the company, by setting up an automatic sys-
tem, is not in fact directly copying.  While this approach does have some
appeal, it is likely only to apply in cases where the company’s systems are so
automatic that a court could reasonably find a lack of volition.  It would
probably not be available to cases, like the DVD editing case or the chil-
dren’s example, where the system is not so automated.  More problemati-
cally, it would ignore the wider context and the underlying policy concerns
that could be balanced through a fair use approach.
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panies are not themselves liable, but can be held liable under certain cir-
cumstances for the infringing actions of their customers. They are subject
to end user liability.  By the same token, companies subject to direct in-
fringement liability should be able to invoke some of the fair use defenses
of their customers.  They should be entitled to invoke end user defenses.
In other words, the invocation of customer interests should not run only
one way, in favor of expanding liability, but the other way as well, in favor
of limiting liability.
This is not merely a matter of formal symmetry.  Rather it highlights
the importance of fully considering the impact of liability on the ability of
consumers to fully and effectively exercise their fair use privileges.  This
interest should be given the same consideration and equal weight as the
interest in reducing infringement.
III.
A.
If the fair use claims of the customers should, as a theoretical matter,
be relevant, how should they be incorporated as a doctrinal matter?  One
way would be to simply factor in the fair use interests of the customers
into the fair use arguments of the company, an avenue I have proposed
elsewhere.32  One advantage of such an approach is that it would be easier
to implement as it does not require much doctrinal change.  Courts could
simply consider customer fair use interests their consideration of the over-
all fair use defense raised by the company.
An alternative, and one that I am promoting here, would be to ex-
pressly recognize a separate defense of fair use enablement.  A company
should be able to argue that its activities are privileged to the extent that it
is enabling certain socially productive fair uses.  The advantage of a sepa-
rate defense is that it would require courts to independently consider the
impact of liability on the interests of the company’s customers, bringing
such interests to the fore.  Although this would require a bit more doctri-
nal innovation, it would still fit comfortably within the courts’ tradition of
construing fair use flexibly, in this case to more fully vindicate the interests
underlying fair use.
In assessing the availability of this defense, the first step would be to
determine whether the actions, if performed by the customer, would
amount to fair use.  If they would not, then the defense would of course be
unavailable.  Thus, for example, in the copy shop cases, if a court deter-
mined that similar copying by the students or professors was not fair use,
then this would end the matter.  At the very least, however, there would
32 Liu, supra note 7.
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be a determination of the fair use claims of the customer, a determination
that is currently missing from the doctrine.
If a court concludes that the use is fair, however, the next step would
be to determine the extent to which the defendant is facilitating the values
underlying the fair use.  In some cases, the value may be non-economic.
For example, in the case of the children’s artwork, the company is helping
grade-school students find a wider audience for their creative efforts.  This
kind of non-economic interest would weigh in favor of the defense.  In
other cases, the value may be primarily economic.  For example, in the
Cartoon Network case, the cable company is primarily making it less costly
and more convenient for consumers to view recorded shows.  This kind of
economic interest would weigh less heavily in favor of the defense.  In yet
other cases, there may be a mix of fair use interests.  For example, in the
copy shop cases, the copy shops are both encouraging education and re-
ducing costs.  In all of the above situations, a court would need to look
into the kind of consumer interest that the fair use defense is vindicating.
This inquiry would also involve an assessment of the extent of the
benefit that the company is conferring, based on its actions.  How much
help is the company giving to those who would exercise their fair use privi-
leges?  What is the magnitude of the benefit?  This would also involve as-
sessing the extent to which customers need the services of the company —
i.e., the extent to which they could, if they wanted to, engage in the fair use
themselves.  If customers would largely be able to engage in the same
range of fair uses without assistance, then the defense would be unavaila-
ble.  Conversely, if fair uses would effectively be barred without assistance
of the company, as is arguably the case with the edited DVDs, then this
would weigh heavily in favor of fair use.
Finally, a court would weigh the benefit conferred by the company to
customer fair use interests against the potential impact on copyright incen-
tives.  Ultimately, any fair use analysis must take account of the potential
to harm the market for the copyrighted work.  Thus, even if a company is
facilitating the fair use rights of its customers, it is possible that, merely by
making the exercise of these rights more efficient, the company will be
significantly hurting the copyright owner’s market.  If this is the case, and
if the harm outweighs the benefits from the fair use, then the defense
would be unavailable.  If, on the other hand, there is no impact on the
copyright owner’s market, then the use should prevail.
To see how this defense would work in practice, it may help to run
through a number of the examples mentioned above.  In the case involving
the grade-school children, the defense would be pretty clearly available.
The children’s uses are almost certainly fair.  Moreover, the fair use is of a
particularly privileged kind, not one based purely on market failure.  The
company’s actions facilitate the exercise of this use.  Finally, there is no
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argument that this has any impact on the copyright owner’s direct mar-
ket.33  Thus, the defense would allow the company to accept drawings by
the children without fear of liability.
The copy shop cases would be a closer call.  First, it is not at all clear
that the customers’ uses would be fair.  While the purpose of the copying
is clearly to facilitate education and study, the copying can in some cases
be rather extensive.  Moreover, there is likely to be a non-trivial impact on
the market for these works, particularly in the aggregate, as they are often
aimed at educational markets.  So the initial assessment of fair use would
be a close call.  Moreover, the nature of the fair use claim would also be
somewhat ambiguous, as it is grounded in both the traditional notion of
fair use (as facilitating education) and the market failure rationale.
If the use by the students is determined to be fair, then the copy shops
facilitate this use, by making it more efficient.  At the same time, however,
it is not as though the students themselves would be prevented from exer-
cising their rights if the copy shops were prevented from engaging in this
activity.  In theory, students would still be able to make their own copies,
using photocopy machines, although this would certainly be less conve-
nient and more costly.  Thus, the facilitation by the copy shops is more
minimal.  Finally, there is a real potential for this activity to harm, not just
some theoretical licensing market, but the direct market for the works, as
these course packs likely displace at least some sales.
Thus, on balance, an enablement defense would be less likely in the
case of the copy shops.  However, the defense would at least permit courts
to consider the fair use interests of the students.  It would permit courts to
consider how imposing liability on the copy shops might affect the fair use
interests of the students.
Finally, the DVD-editing companies would likely have a strong en-
ablement defense.  If consumers edited their own DVDs, they would likely
have a strong fair use defense, insofar as the activity is private, non-com-
mercial, and has no impact on the market for DVDs.34  (Indeed, the ability
to edit DVDs would probably expand the market for those movies.)
Moreover, the DVD-editing companies play an essential role in enabling
fair use, as the consumers themselves do not have the technical expertise
33 It is true that there is a theoretical harm to the indirect market for licenses.
Putting aside for now the well-noted problem of circularity in this argu-
ment, in this particular case, the nature of the fair use interest would pre-
clude consideration of the licensing market.  The children’s use would be
fair whether or not the schools could easily secure a license.  In other cases,
consideration of the indirect market for licenses would similarly depend on
the nature of the underlying fair use interest.
34 See, e.g., Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
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to edit the DVDs.35  Finally, the provision of this service is unlikely to
have a material impact on the market for DVDs, as it requires consumers
to first purchase the DVD before having it edited.36  Thus, there is a de-
cent chance that these companies would be able to take advantage of this
defense.
In all of these cases, a defense of fair use enablement would recognize
the important role that these companies play in facilitating and enabling
certain favored fair uses.  It would also recognize that fair use is not a
privilege that can be exercised in isolation, but one that may require cer-
tain conditions to thrive.
B.
Although this Essay has suggested reforms for one particular doctrine
in copyright, the implications are significantly broader.  As the above ex-
amples suggest, a focus on enabling fair uses will only become more im-
portant as digital technology allows individuals to engage in more
individual creativity.37  We are seeing this already in the explosion of user-
generated content. Whether we call it peer production,38 amateur con-
tent,39 remix culture,40 or consumer or user creativity,41 it is clear that
digital technology and networked communications systems are making it
much easier for individuals to create and to distribute their creative mater-
ials, to become less passive in their consumption of copyrighted works, to
engage far more actively and creatively with copyrighted works.  To be-
have, in short, increasingly like the children in my daughter’s class.
35 Note that the DVD-editing companies might still face liability for circumven-
tion under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).  An analysis of this issue is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
36 For this same reason, any impact on the market for edited versions of the
movie would be largely irrelevant, as the service does not in fact displace
any sales (unless the movie studios could show that consumers would buy
an edited version in addition to the original version, which seems unlikely).
37 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007);
Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright
Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s The-
ory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397 (2003); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory
Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004).
38 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007).
39 Hunter & Lastowka, supra note 37.
40 LESSIG, supra note 8.
41 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 397
(2003); Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, supra note
37.
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The issue I highlight in this short Essay suggests that we need to pay
greater attention to the conditions that make this kind of creativity possi-
ble.  It is not enough to say that individuals have the right to engage in
creative uses of copyrighted works in the privacy of their own homes, and
only to the extent that they themselves have the technical know-how to do
so.  Rather, it is important to make sure that those who facilitate and en-
able such creative uses, whether by providing an important technology or
permitting communication of the results, be sheltered from liability too.
Current law does recognize this interest already, to some extent.  As
already mentioned above, this interest is recognized in the area of indirect
liability and the regulation of technologies that facilitate fair use.  The
Sony doctrine and subsequent cases interpreting Sony are expressly driven
by concerns that extending third-party liability too broadly can have a neg-
ative impact on the practical ability to engage in fair use.42 Sony is thus
careful about not eliminating certain technologies from the market.  This
reflects recognition that consumers may need access to technologies in or-
der to exercise their fair use rights.  As I have argued here, this interest
should extend not only to technologies, but to services as well.  This will
only become more important as technology providers enter into increas-
ingly interactive relationships with their customers.
Unfortunately, this awareness of the importance of enabling technol-
ogies is not apparent in other areas of copyright law.  Perhaps the most
egregious example is in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s provisions
involving anti-circumvention.43  Enacted by Congress in 1998, the DMCA
gives copyright owners an additional cause of action against those who
circumvent technological measures (such as the encryption used to protect
DVD movies) designed to control access to copyrighted materials.44  It
also contains a provision that outlaws the sale and distribution of technol-
ogies that facilitate circumvention — the so-called “tools provision.”45
Concerned that this new form of liability might have the effect of lim-
iting fair use rights of individuals and third-parties, Congress provided a
number of statutory exemptions.46  It also gave the Librarian of Congress
the power, through regulation, to exempt certain classes of works from
circumvention liability.47  Congress did not, however, provide any exemp-
tions for liability under the tools provision.  Thus, Congress placed con-
sumers in the curious position of having the right to circumvent under
certain circumstances, but no readily available access to technologies that
42 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
43 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2006).
44 Id. § 1201(a)(1).
45 Id. § 1201(a)(2), (b).
46 Id. § 1201(d)–(k).
47 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
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would help them exercise those rights.  These provisions are a particularly
extreme example of the failure to consider the extent to which formal legal
privileges can practically be exercised.
At the same time, other parts of the DMCA do appear to recognize,
albeit indirectly, an interest in facilitating consumer fair use privileges.  In
particular, the DMCA provides a safe harbor for companies that host
user-generated and user-loaded content.48  This is what permits companies
like YouTube to host videos uploaded by customers without fear of crip-
pling liability.49  Although the safe harbor was enacted primarily at the
behest of Internet intermediaries concerned about liability, it has had the
effect of enabling a tremendous amount of consumer creativity.  The
breathing space created by these safe harbors is an example of an issue
that deserves more attention: i.e., the role of intermediaries in facilitating
and encouraging creative consumer fair uses.  This interest should apply,
not only to internet intermediaries, but all companies that facilitate this
interest.
IV.
In the end, my daughter has not been permanently damaged by U.S.
copyright law.  She continues to draw and to express herself through art.  I
have managed to convince her that, as long as she does not commercialize
the results, she is perfectly free to draw any “famous” character that she
likes.  So I doubt there will be any long-lasting harm to her psyche.  (Cer-
tainly, any such harm is likely to be swamped by all of the other kinds of
long-lasting harm her parents are inadvertently inflicting upon her.)
Yet I can’t help noticing that she is more careful now when she draws.
She will check with me, sometimes, to see whether she can draw some-
thing.  She will ask me about things that her friends do, to make sure that
they aren’t copyright violations.  She is probably far more aware of copy-
right law than many nine-year olds.  The copyright industries may well be
quite happy with this result, as they have invested much in recent years in
an effort to educate children about copyright law.50  Despite my love of
copyright law, I can’t help feeling a bit sad.
48 Id. § 512.
49 But see Viacom v. YouTube, 2010 WL 2532404 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010) (hold-
ing that YouTube fell within the scope of the safe harbor).
50 See, e.g., Copyright Society of the U.S.A., Elementary School Teacher Curricu-
lum Materials for Copyright Awareness Week, available at http://www.
csusa.org/caw/caw_2006_home.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
